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Doing Things with the Past: A Critique of the 
Use of History by Hong Kong’s Court of First 
Instance in W v Registrar of Marriages
Q
Marco Wan*
The Court of First Instance's decision to deny W, a male-to-female transsex-
ual, the right to marry is premised on the understanding that marriage has been 
a largely stable and monolithic institution until recently. This article challenges 
the court's narrative of marriage history. It reconsiders the judicial historiogra-
phy on which the decision is based, and by placing the W case in the context of 
the development of marriage argues that W should be allowed to marry at the 
present time. 
 In W v Registrar of Marriages, the Court of First Instance in Hong 
Kong denied a male-to-female transsexual the right to marry.1 Justice 
Andrew Cheung’s judgment is based on two lines of reasoning: fi rst, that 
as a matter of statutory interpretation a male-to-female transsexual can-
not be defi ned as a “woman” or as “female” under the legislation govern-
ing marriage in Hong Kong; and second, that the constitutional right to 
marry as defi ned by the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights does not cover 
transsexual marriage.
Justice Cheung’s opinion on the two issues above – statutory interpre-
tation and constitutionality – is premised on a discussion of the history of 
marriage, both in Hong Kong and in England. By examining the colonial 
origins of Hong Kong’s Marriage Ordinance and the changes occasioned 
by the local reforms of 1970–71, he opines that allowing transsexuals 
to marry at the present juncture would represent an unprecedented and 
unjustifi able challenge to the institution of marriage which, in his view, 
has been remarkably stable over the years, despite various vicissitudes 
which are regarded as largely irrelevant. In other words, the court’s 
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understanding of history underpins its conclusion that transsexuals do 
not have the right to marry in Hong Kong at the present time. 
This article argues that the court’s understanding of the history of 
marriage is fundamentally fl awed. It draws on the work of historians of 
marriage to show that, far from being a stable and monolithic institution, 
marriage has been consistently modifying and updating itself, especially 
since the nineteenth century.2 By critiquing the court’s use of history 
both in its discussion of statutory interpretation and in its analysis of the 
applicant’s constitutional right to marry, it further demonstrates that set-
ting the “W” case in the context of the history of marriage would in fact 
lead to the opposite conclusion: giving transsexuals the right to marry in 
Hong Kong at the present time represents a logical development in this 
history.3 
The History of Marriage and Statutory Interpretation
The fi rst issue which the court discussed was whether a male-to-female 
transsexual would fall within the scope of the word “woman” in s40(2) of 
the Marriage Ordinance, and also within the scope of the word “female” 
in s21 of the same ordinance and s20(1)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Ordinance. The court reiterated that it would adopt a purposive approach 
to interpretation, without distorting the plain meaning of the statute.4 
The history of marriage is relevant to the issue of statutory interpre-
tation because the court deemed it necessary to return to the origins 
and developments of marriage laws in Hong Kong in order to ascertain 
the purpose of the ordinance. Justice Cheung opines that it is “correct” 
to view the Marriage Ordinance as “a piece of legislation to recognize, 
regulate and restrict marriages in our society.”5 He then elaborates upon 
this triple function of recognition, regulation, and restriction. The idea 
that the ordinance recognizes marriage is uncontroversial, for its primary 
2 See, for instance, Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000); Leonore Davidoff, Megan Doolittle, Janet Fink and Kath-
erine Holden, The Family Story: Blood, Contract and Intimacy 1830–1960 (London and New 
York: Longman, 1999); Marilyn Yalom, A History of the Wife (New York: HarperCollins, 2001); 
Martha Vicinus (ed), A Widening Sphere: Changing Roles of Victorian Women (London: Methuen 
& Co., 1980); Edward Westermarck, History of Human Marriage (3 vols) (London: Macmillan, 
1925). 
3 For useful discussions of transgender jurisprudence and culture more generally, see Andrew 
Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence (London: Cavendish 2002); Paisley Currah, Richard M. 
Juang, Shannon Price Minter (ed) Transgender Rights (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis 
Press 2006); and Stephen Whittle, Respect and Equality (London: Cavendish 2002). 
4 Paras 106–107.
5 Para 111. 
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function is, after all, to give legal recognition to properly conducted mar-
riages. The use of the word “regulate”, however, deserves scrutiny, for it 
is here that the court fi rst engages with the history of marriage. In elabo-
rating upon the way in which the legislation regulates marriage, Justice 
Cheung returns to a specifi c moment in the history of marriage in Hong 
Kong, that of the reforms of 1970 to 1971. 
Prior to the enactment of the reforms, there existed three different 
types of marriage in the territory: Chinese customary marriage, which 
allowed men to take concubines; Chinese modern marriage, as outlined 
in the Chinese Civil Code; and marriage contracted under the Marriage 
Ordinance, known as registry marriage. The reforms of 1970–71 con-
solidated marriages in Hong Kong so that from that point on, the only 
legally recognized form of marriage was registry marriage. Registry mar-
riage is now defi ned in s40(1) of the Marriage Ordinance, which states 
that every marriage under the ordinance is to be a Christian marriage 
or the civil equivalent of a Christian marriage.6 Justice Cheung notes: 
“after the great reforms of 1970/1971, registry marriage in accordance with 
the Ordinance is now the only way to contract a legal marriage in Hong 
Kong. The Ordinance regulates how a marriage is to be celebrated”.7
It is important to ponder over the court’s use of history here. The 
primary aim of the 1970/1971 reforms was to streamline a messy system 
of marriage, and in particular to abolish the system of concubinage. A 
question arises: what relevance do these reforms have to do with the 
question at hand? In what ways is the history of how customary marriage 
was abolished in Hong Kong similar to the issue of whether transsexu-
als can get married? The answer, of course, is that there is no relevance: 
concubines and male-to-female transsexual wives are entirely different 
creatures. In this light, the court’s use of this particular episode in history 
is highly suspect. Given the complete lack of relevance, what role is this 
judicial use of history performing?
The answer lies in the following paragraph of the judgment. Justice 
Cheung notes that his discussion of the 1970/71 reforms “leads to” his 
fi nal point about the function of the Marriage Ordinance, “namely, 
restriction”.8 The effect of the court’s use of history suddenly becomes 
clear: in its discussion of the reforms, the court is in effect giving a 
historical narrative of how marriage became increasingly restricted in 
6 For further discussions of the 1970–71 reform and of the history of marriage in Hong Kong, see 
Leonard Pegg, Family Law in Hong Kong, 3rd ed (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1994), pp 3–34 
and Athena Liu, Family Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 1999), pp 3–55. 
7 Para 112 (my italics).
8 Para 113.
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Hong Kong, a story of how different forms of union were discarded so 
that only one dominant form – Christian marriage or its civil equiva-
lent – remains. Within this narrative, to ‘regulate’ takes on the same 
meaning as to ‘restrict’. The function of the seemingly unrelated episode 
of standardizing marriage is therefore to set the stage for the court to 
say that the primary function of the ordinance is to restrict marriage to 
only one recognizable form, and that given the precedent of denying 
Chinese customary marriage, the law will not likely be in favour of any 
other dissident form of union, such as transsexual marriage. The court’s 
construction of the history of marriage here is a sleight of hand: by draw-
ing on a completely unrelated episode from the past, it presents a narra-
tive of history which seems to justify the view that the proper function 
of the Marriage Ordinance is, “namely, restriction” of unfamiliar forms 
of union. 
Having set the stage for a restrictive view of the ordinance, the court 
then embarks on a discussion of the colonial origins of the current mar-
riage laws in Hong Kong. Justice Cheung reminds us that the Marriage 
Ordinance was fi rst enacted as Ordinance No.14 of 1875. The recourse 
to the genesis of the Marriage Ordinance forms the lynchpin of his argu-
ment that, on a proper interpretation of the words, a male-to-female 
transsexual does not come within the meaning of “woman” or “female” 
in the relevant legislation. His argument is as follows: given the histori-
cal context, the law of marriage in Hong Kong “was modeled essentially 
on the law of marriage in the United Kingdom, of which Hong Kong was 
a colony.” 9 As a result, the ordinance must be interpreted in accordance 
with the doctrine of the Church of England. Citing Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, he notes that according to Church doctrine, “originally, mar-
riage had a lot to do with procreation and the continuation of the fam-
ily line. That is, or was, particularly true with a predominantly Chinese 
society in Hong Kong.”10 For Justice Cheung, procreation is an integral 
part of marriage in Hong Kong due to the historical genesis of the ter-
ritory’s marriage laws. In his opinion, a male-to-female transsexual may 
look, act and sound like a woman, but the inability to procreate would 
mean automatic disqualifi cation from consideration as a “woman” under 
the ordinance. He goes on to describe this view of the procreative aspect 
of marriage as “natural” and notes that the English case of Corbett v Cor-
bett functions as authority for the Hong Kong courts to follow.11 While 
Justice Cheung acknowledges that it may be possible to construe the 
9 Para 115.
10 Para 206.
11 Para 117.
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ordinance as an “ongoing Act” in which the court gives a modern-day 
construction of the words of the ordinance in light of changing social 
and cultural circumstances, he opines that to do so in this instance would 
amount to unjustifi ably altering or extending the meaning of the words.
There are a number of counter-arguments which can be advanced 
against the view that marriage is necessarily for procreation, one of 
which would be to question the court’s contentiously dismissive gesture 
of casting married couples who cannot have children as “exceptions” 
from the norm (this category presumably includes couples who are fertile 
but who do not want children).12 From the perspective of a critique of 
the court’s use of history, the narrative of the history of marriage which 
Justice Cheung here posits, which insists that nineteenth-century Angli-
can Church doctrine is determinative of our understanding of marriage 
in twenty-fi rst century Hong Kong, is problematic in several respects. 
First of all, Justice Cheung’s recourse to an originalist construction of 
the ordinance masks the crucial fact that the view of the role of procre-
ation in marriage within the Anglican community has changed over the 
years, so that it is now possible to argue that procreation is no longer a 
requirement of marriage even under Church doctrine. The changes in 
the view of Christian marriage within the Church of England can be 
traced by looking at the changes in the pronouncements on sex and mar-
riage in the Lambeth Conferences. The Lambeth Conferences are global 
events convened once every ten years by the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
and represent occasions when bishops from all over the world gather for 
worship, study and conversation. The fi rst Lambeth conference began in 
1867, and they remain one of the most important gatherings within the 
Anglican community. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the participants at the 
Lambeth conference regarded “with alarm the growing practice of 
the artifi cial restriction of the family”, and called upon all Christian 
people “to discountenance the use of all artifi cial means of restriction 
as demoralising to character and hostile to national welfare”.13 In other 
words, the Church regarded procreation as the centre piece of marriage, 
and any attempt at restricting it was deemed unacceptable. However, by 
1930 there was already a shift in attitude: even though the bishops still 
agreed that “the primary purpose for which marriage exists is the pro-
creation of children,” they agreed that in some situations there may be 
“a clearly felt moral obligation to limit or avoid parenthood”, in which 
12 Para 123.
13 Resolution 41 of the 1908 Lambeth Conference. Available at http://www.lambethconference.
org/resolutions/1908/1908-41.cfm (visited 28 Jan 2011).
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case the use of contraception between husband and wife was permitted.14 
The 1930 conference signals an important change in the Church’s atti-
tude towards procreation in marriage, for it acknowledges that there are 
legitimate reasons and circumstances whereby a married couple would 
not have and may not even want children. 
It is with Resolution 115 of the 1958 conference that we see the clear-
est move away from the presumption that marriage could not be dissoci-
ated from procreation:
The Conference believes that the responsibility for deciding upon the num-
ber and frequency of children has been laid by God upon the consciences of 
parents everywhere; that this planning, in such ways as are mutually accept-
able to husband and wife in Christian conscience, is a right and important 
factor in Christian family life and should be the result of positive choice 
before God. Such responsible parenthood, built on obedience to all the 
duties of marriage, requires a wise stewardship of the resources and abilities 
of the family as well as a thoughtful consideration of the varying population 
needs and problems of society and the claims of future generations.15
The use of the expression “positive choice” in the context of procreation 
in marriage clearly shows that the decision whether to have children or 
not is to be made by the married couple in light of a complex interplay of 
factors, and that it can no longer be assumed that anyone who gets mar-
ried would also want to procreate. In fact, the emphasis on “responsible 
parenthood”, “wise stewardship of resources” and “thoughtful consider-
ation” of societal and demographic needs hints at a reversal of attitude 
within the Church: instead of automatically assuming that someone who 
marries would also want children, these expressions suggest that the deci-
sion to have children is not to be taken lightly, and that if the balance 
of factors is not right, the Church would in fact encourage the couple 
to abstain from procreation. The decision not to have children, even 
from the outset of the marriage, can thus still be completely in line with 
Church doctrine. 
In light of the changes in the Church of England’s attitude towards 
the relationship between marriage and procreation, as refl ected in the 
developments in the Lambeth conferences of the twentieth century, it 
is no longer possible to state, as Justice Cheung does, that “the central 
14 Resolution 15 of the 1930 Lambeth Conference. Available at http://www.lambethconference.
org/resolutions/1930/1930-15.cfm (visited 28 Jan 2011).
15 Resolution 115 of the 1958 Lambeth Conference. Available at http://www.lambethconference.
org/resolutions/1958/1958-115.cfm (visited 28 Jan 2011).
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theme of marriage, as is understood traditionally, is for the procreation 
of children”.16 Justice Cheung’s historical narrative presents the Church 
of England’s attitude towards the centrality of procreation within mar-
riage as a static one, when in reality this view has been rapidly evolving. 
It would therefore be unjust to deny a male-to-female the right to marry 
in the name of a Christian understanding of marriage carried over from 
the distant past.17
In addition to the need to interpret the Marriage Ordinance as an 
“ongoing Act” in order to bring it in line with developments in Church 
doctrine, there is a further reason for which the court’s insistence on 
the link between marriage and procreation is problematic. The histor-
ical narrative which the court constructs here fl ies in the face of the 
nineteenth-century case of Hyde v Hyde, which it cites in support of 
its argument and whose defi nition of marriage is enshrined in s40(2) 
of the Marriage Ordinance.18 In Hyde, Lord Penzance opines that 
“marriage as understood in Christendom is the voluntary union for life of 
one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”.19 Justice Cheung, 
when citing Hyde, claims that even though “this shorter defi nition does 
not […] expressly refer to procreation, the traditional signifi cance of pro-
creation in Christian marriage, when viewed in the relevant religious 
and historical context, cannot be doubted”.20
One wonders which “relevant religious and historical context” he is 
referring to when he opines that “the traditional signifi cance of procre-
ation in Christian marriage” is everywhere evident in Lord Penzance’s 
defi nition of marriage. When one returns to Hyde itself, it is possible to 
argue that the Lord Penzance’s defi nition should be read literally: it does 
not include any reference to procreation, therefore procreation does not 
fall within the defi nition of marriage laid down in Hyde and enshrined in 
s 40(2) of Hong Kong’s Marriage Ordinance. Support for a literal reading 
of the defi nition can be found within the language of Hyde itself. As he 
ponders over the meaning of marriage, Lord Penzance notes:
What, then, is the nature of this institution [of marriage] as understood 
in Christendom? Its incidents vary in different countries, but what are its 
16 Para 123.
17 This section addresses the judgment on its own terms by assuming that the Church of England’s 
view of marriage is indeed defi nitive in Hong Kong. One further issue that could potentially be 
raised is that after 1997, all ordinances should be interpreted in accordance with the Basic Law, 
and there is no special status granted to the Anglican Church in that document. 
18 (1865–69) LR 1 P & D 130
19 Ibid., 130.
20 Para 116.
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essential elements and invariable features? If it be of common acceptance 
and existence, it must needs (however varied in different countries in its 
minor incidents) have some pervading identity and universal basis. I con-
ceive that marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be 
defi ned as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the 
exclusion of all others.21
What Lord Penzance does in Hyde is to lay down the lowest common 
denominator for defi ning Christian marriage: the judge was determin-
ing the “essential elements and invariable features” without which 
a union cannot be said to fulfi ll the requirements of Christian mar-
riage. In other words, the court in Hyde was concerned with determin-
ing all the attributes without which a union cannot be regarded as a 
Christian marriage. Signifi cantly, procreation does not appear within 
this attempt to fi nd the lowest common denominator; it is not part of 
marriage’s “pervading identity and universal basis”. The implication 
of Hyde is clear: Christian marriage, as defi ned here, does not require 
procreation. It is therefore problematic for the Hong Kong court to say 
that even though Hyde did not refer to procreation, “the traditional 
signifi cance of Christian marriage” cannot be doubted. The opposite 
is true: Hyde did not refer to procreation because it did not conceive 
of procreation as a necessary part of Christian marriage. The lack of 
reference to procreation is carried over to s40(2) of the Marriage Ordi-
nance: Christian marriage or the civil equivalent of a Christian mar-
riage” as defi ned in that provision merely refers to a formal ceremony 
recognized by law whereby a man and a woman enter into a volun-
tary union to the exclusion of all others. To say that the importance 
of procreation “cannot be doubted” in the defi nition given in Hyde 
and enshrined in the ordinance is to impose onto it something that is 
simply not there.
To summarise this section of the argument, when we interrogate 
the court’s use of history in this case, whether by highlighting the irrel-
evance of certain historical episodes cited, by returning to the nine-
teenth-century case of Hyde, or by exposing the problems with the 
court’s recourse to the colonial origins of the Marriage Ordinance which 
supposedly justifi es an originalist interpretation of the current laws, it 
becomes evident that the court’s view that a male-to-female transsex-
ual does not have the right to marry because she cannot procreate is 
intensely problematic.
21 See n13 p 133. 
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The History of Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Marry
The court identifi es Art 37 of the Basic Law and Art 19 of the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights (which is based on Art 23 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) as the relevant constitutional 
law instruments under consideration. It rightly identifi es the question 
of constitutionality as continuous with the question of interpretation 
discussed above: “the prior question is and remains: what is a “man” 
or a “woman” in the defi nition of “marriage” when referred to in the 
Basic Law (or in Art 19(2) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights)”?22 Jus-
tice Cheung opines that the answer to this question rests on the need 
for “societal consensus” on the issue of transsexual marriage in Hong 
Kong: he notes since there is insuffi cient evidence to show that Hong 
Kong society as a whole accepts the idea of transsexual marriage, the 
court must refrain from tampering with the status quo, for doing so 
would be tantamount to giving the constitutional right to marry a 
meaning not originally within the scope of the Basic Law or the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights.23 
Once again, the question of history is inextricably tied to the ques-
tion of law in the judgment; the court constructs a narrative of his-
tory to justify its decision that there is a lack of the requisite societal 
consensus on transsexual marriage. Early on in the discussion, Justice 
Cheung notes: “Marriage as a social institution has existed for thou-
sands of years. Whilst different marriage laws have come and gone, the 
institution, as evolved, remains”.24 Even though he pays lip service to 
the idea that marriage as an institution does change by noting that it has 
“evolved”, the tenor of this brief historical narrative is clear: marriage 
as an institution has been relatively stable for “thousands of years” and 
should remain so. The court acknowledges that changes have occurred 
in the way people conceive of marriage in present-day Hong Kong, and 
realises that there is a trend moving away from the traditional model, 
yet it does not ultimately regard any of these changes as relevant. Over-
all, the historical narrative in the judgment presents marriage as a fi xed, 
even monolithic entity that has resisted challenges. The court’s histori-
cal narrative therefore casts the current case of transsexual marriage as 
a challenge to millennia of conjugal orthodoxy, and which threatens to 
erode a largely fi xed institution. In light of this view of the history of 
marriage, it is no surprise that the court believes that Hong Kong society 
22 Para 183. 
23 Paras 219–223.
24 Para 201. 
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has not reached a stage where transsexual marriage is no longer regarded 
as “repugnant”.25
However, as historians of marriage have pointed out, it is erroneous 
to view marriage as an institution that has remained more or less stable 
throughout the centuries. In fact, the opposite is true: the institution of 
marriage has been continuously transforming, modifying and updating 
itself, so that it has never been a stranger to change. Its very nature and 
defi nition has been evolving for centuries. 
Again, one needs to place the current case in historical perspective in 
order to think about whether transsexuals should have the right to marry. 
One major problem with Justice Cheung’s concept of “societal consen-
sus” is that it is resolutely ahistoric: he notes that “one is concerned with 
what the current societal consensus is, rather than what it once was, or, 
what it might become in the future”.26 While this focus on the present 
may be appropriate for some questions of constitutional right, given that 
marriage has a long and complex history in human society, one cannot 
mentally cut off this rich history when deciding on the question of the 
right to marry. Instead, one should understand the current case as one 
point in the evolution of the history of marriage, and reframe the ques-
tion of the constitutional right to marry within the context of the ways 
in which marriage as an institution has developed over the years.
This section therefore suggests that, as an alternative to the court’s 
search for current “societal consensus”, one should place the question of 
whether ‘W’ has the right to marry within the context of the history of 
marriage. And within this context, it is amply clear that this right should 
not be denied. 
This is because historically, the understanding of what a “woman” is 
or does within the context of marriage has evolved to promote greater 
equality.27 The extent of this evolution can be seen when we contrast 
the legal position of women within the institution of marriage in the 
eighteenth century with their legal position in the twentieth-fi rst cen-
tury. In the eighteenth century, the notion of coverture dictated that a 
married woman had no separate legal existence from that of her husband. 
William Blackstone describes this doctrine as follows:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at 
25 Para 206.
26 Para 191.
27 On the specifi cally legal changes in marriage history, see chapters 3 and 4 in Sandra Feldman, 
Women and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose 
wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing.28
Under this doctrine, a married woman’s legal existence was subsumed 
under that of her husband. She could not own property in her own capac-
ity, she was not allowed to live separately from her husband, she could 
not enter into contractual agreements on her own, she could not have a 
separate bank account, and legal custody of the children belonged to the 
father. As the popular saying went, “husband and wife are one person, 
and that person is the husband”.29
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and the entire 
duration of the twentieth century, there was a clear movement towards 
guaranteeing greater equality for women within marriage. The Matri-
monial Clauses Act, or the Divorce Act, of 1857, expanded the grounds 
of divorce available to a woman. It was still easier for a man to seek a 
divorce from this wife than the other way around, but a series of acts 
passed in 1878, 1886, and 1895 brought a wife’s grounds for terminating 
a marriage increasingly close to those of her husband. The 1857 Act also 
gave married women greater control of their property. In 1870, the Mar-
ried Women’s Property Act was passed to increase the number of ways in 
which married women could retain their right to property, and in 1882 
a further Act was passed which in effect gave a woman full ownership 
of any property which she owned at the time of marriage and which 
she acquired after marriage.30 Moreover, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century it was still widely believed that giving women the 
vote would lead to domestic discord, in so far as differences of politi-
cal opinion may divide husband and wife. However, this belief did not 
prevent the enfranchisement of women in 1918. In the United States, a 
judgment handed down by the Supreme Court in 1873 initially denied 
married women the right to practice law, on the grounds that “the fam-
ily institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct 
and independent career from that of her husband” and “the law of the 
Creator” dictates that the “paramount destiny and mission of woman are 
to fulfi l the noble and benign offi ces of wife and mother”.31 However, the 
same Court granted the applicant a license to practise law in 1892, thus 
ensuring greater equality between husband and wife in the occupations 
28 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol 1 (1765–1769), 3rd ed (Dublin: 
printed for John Exshaw, Henry Saunders, Boulter Grierson, and James Williams, 1769), p 442.
29 Cited in Yalom (see n 2 above), p 185.
30 See “Lee Holcombe, Victorian Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women’s Property 
Law, 1857–1882”, in Vicinus (see n 2), pp 3–29.
31 Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US 130 (1872), p 142.
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in which they can engage. Finally, on an international level, Art 16 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women clearly states that its signatory states are to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure equality within marriage, including giv-
ing the woman the same rights and responsibilities as her husband during 
and at the dissolution of a marriage.32
The historical trajectory in Hong Kong has been complicated by 
its dual nature as a colonial society for much of its recent past, and 
also by its Chinese cultural context. One commentator has astutely 
pointed out that at times, Britain’s desire to respect Chinese cultural 
traditions resulted in a fossilized understanding of Chinese culture that 
hindered the promotion of equality within marriage.33 The trajectory 
has been convoluted and the struggle has been hard, but with hindsight 
it is possible to say that Hong Kong has largely, if somewhat belatedly, 
followed the trend towards equality in marriage. By Ordinance No.5 
of 1858, a number of imperial enactments were given effect in Hong 
Kong, including provisions on divorce. The specifi c context of land 
inheritance in the New Territories complicated the question of married 
women’s control of property, but after intense activism the indigenous 
women in the New Territories were fi nally granted the right to inherit 
land in 1994.34 The watershed marriage law reform of 1970 abolished 
concubinage and extended women’s right to inheritance and property 
ownership.
The changes in the history of marriage show us that, far from being 
an institution which has remained largely resistant to change over the 
years, marriage as an institution has been constantly modernising, revis-
ing and updating itself. Justice Cheung says that “Leaving aside those 
occasions when the law seeks to modify or change the social institution 
of marriage, the law’s function is really to recognise, regulate and impose 
restrictions that represent generally recognised considerations of public 
interest on the institution of marriage as practised in society.” However, 
one lesson that history teaches us is that it is precisely “those occasions 
32 Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article16 
(visited 22 March 2011).
33 See Carol Jones, Women and the Law in Colonial Hong Kong, in Benjamin K.P. Leung and 
Teresa Y.C. Wong (eds), 25 Years of Social and Economic Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
University of Hong Kong, 1994), pp 111–133. 
34 For a useful fi rst-hand account of the women’s rights movement in Hong Kong, with a dis-
cussion of the question of female inheritance of property in the New Territories, see Carole 
Petersen, “Equality as a Human Right: The Development of Anti-Discrimination Law in Hong 
Kong”, (1996) 34 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 335. For a discussion of a similar con-
text with a more jurisprudential focus, see Harriet Samuels, “Women and the Law in Hong 
Kong: A Feminist Analysis”, in Raymond Wacks (ed), Hong Kong, China and 1997: Essays in 
Legal Theory (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1993), pp 61–87.
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when the law seeks to modify or change the social institution of mar-
riage” which are important, for upon those legal changes is the institu-
tion of marriage built. To leave them aside, as Justice Cheung believes we 
should do, would be nothing less than an act of willful blindness to how 
marriage has evolved. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the emphasis was on 
erasing the unjust distinctions between men and their wives, of making 
married women more equal to their spouses in terms of their rights and 
status, a move which would have been considered revolutionary at the 
time it was made. The current dilemma of whether we can make the 
seemingly revolutionary move of conceptualising a “woman” in mar-
riage to include a male-to-female transsexual is a twenty-fi rst century 
manifestation of the question of how far equality can be assured for the 
person occupying that position. In other words, the current issue of 
whether “woman” can mean a male-to-female transsexual in the con-
text of marriage is a continuation of the question of how “woman” 
should be understood or conceptualized in marriage, and when the 
issue is placed in historical perspective, it becomes clear that a decision 
to allow W to marry would have been in line with the trend of promot-
ing equality within the legal conception of a woman. 
To include a male-to-female transsexual within the defi nition of 
“woman” in the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and the Hong Kong 
Bill of Rights would of course be a step towards consolidating the equal 
right to marry.35 The legislature and the courts have shown admirable 
willingness to promote equality in their conception of a married woman 
throughout history, and the current case is simply another step in a long 
and continuing historical development. Giving a woman the right to 
own property like her husband, or giving a woman the right to open 
her own bank account, would have seemed as radical and inconceiv-
able back then as giving a transsexual woman the right to marry perhaps 
does today. If the legislature or the courts of the past had deferred to 
“societal consensus”, those changes would never have occurred, and 
equality would have been denied to the women. However, those changes 
seem to us completely natural now. The point in recounting the his-
torical development of marriage is not to argue that those developments 
occurred independently of societal consensus, but to point out that 
instead of deploying the ahistoric concept of societal consensus in the 
fi rst place when determining whether W can marry, one could instead 
think historically and place the current case in the context of how 
35 For a further discussion of equality, see Kelley Loper’s article in this issue of HKLJ. 
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marriage has evolved. From this latter perspective, it is clear that the 
courts in Hong Kong should have the courage to continue this historical 
progress. Ensuring equality is emphatically a judicial issue and should not 
require societal consensus; placing the case in history shows that grant-
ing the right to marry to W would simply mean continuing the histori-
cal trajectory towards equality. The history of marriage continues to be 
written, and fi fty years from now, a judicial decision allowing transsexuals 
to marry would seem as sensible as giving a married woman the right to 
open her own bank account or to practise law as a vocation.
Conclusion
Oscar Wilde once said that “the one duty we owe to history is to rewrite 
it”.36 In the present context, this duty seems more important than ever; 
the Court of First Instance’s decision to deny “W” the right to marry 
is premised on a fundamentally fl awed understanding of the history of 
marriage: it uses unrelated historical episodes to construct its histori-
cal narrative; it overlooks changes in the Church of England’s views of 
procreation through time; it misreads nineteenth-century case law; it is 
insuffi ciently attuned to the process of revision and updating in which 
the institution of marriage has been engaged over the years, and it fails 
to put the present case in the context of the institution’s historical devel-
opment. How history is written has a profound impact on how we view 
the present. It is imperative for us, as lawyers and as jurists, to have a 
proper understanding of the history of marriage as the debate over “W” 
continues in Hong Kong.
36 Oscar Wilde, “The Critic as Artist”, in The Soul of Man Under Socialism and Selected Critical 
Prose, ed Linda Dowling (London: Penguin, 2001), p 231. 
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